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Basic notes
This thesis2 is concerned with interactions of actors, stakeholders and the
like. In order to avoid cluttering the text with forms like he/she we are going
to use male forms but for cases where we describe interactions of pairs of
parties where we try to use the male form for one party and the female form
for the other. Sorry, but a word to the wise is enough.
The mathematics is kept at a low and colloquial level in the text but when
more formal approaches are needed. The notation we use is standard and
should cause neither troubles nor misunderstandings. Anyway notes will be
used whenever necessary.
As to the written language, we apologize since now for its quality that we
strove it was our best possible. We only underline that we tried to follow
conventions used in the US version of English and that we tried to formulate
our sentences as plain and short as possible, sometimes clumsily failing the
target.
Assumptions
As usually, in this dissertation there are terms that we use without any
precise definition since they are thought to belong to the common knowledge
and since any definition must rely on primitive terms so that it is neither
possible nor convenient to define everything. This is true for the term set,
for instance, and is common practice in mathematics. Anyway we devote this
section to the description of the terms that we are going to use as primitive
in this thesis.
The first term is the word actor. With this term we denote any [possibly
collective] entity that is capable of acting in various contexts according to
some deterministic or probabilistic set of rules. In the former case the rules
are fixed and are chosen in a predefined way so that they may be arranged
to form a recipe or, more formally, an algorithm or a procedure.
In the latter case every rule has either a objective or a subjective probability
of being chosen. In this case the choice of a rule from a given set may be
carried out through the drawing of a purposely many faced die. In this case
we may speak of stochastic recipes or algorithms. In this thesis we will focus
mainly on algorithms and procedures.
The term actor identifies a very wide set so we need some terms to charac-
terize its meaningful and possibly overlapping subsets. Among these terms
2We are going to use both the term thesis and dissertation simply to be less monotonous
and to show off a richer lexicon.
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we mention here the term decider. With this word we translate the Ital-
ian word decisore with the same meaning of the more classical decision
maker. There is no rational reason behind this choice but a matter of taste.
Other terms include the words stakeholder and expert that will be defined
and characterized at the proper places.
In the thesis we are going to distinguish between deterministic and non-
deterministic situations. We refer to [89] for this characterization. With the
term determinism we denote the fact that any action performed by an ac-
tor is guaranteed to have always the same outcome so that, for instance, it
always fails or succeeds. If this is not guaranteed so that an actor must check
the outcome of his actions to verify their effective outcomes we speak of non
determinism. We stress how this distinction has nothing to do with prob-
ability assignments of success or failure and tries to describe the interactions
of the decision processes of autonomous actors that competitively act in the
same environment.
In the thesis we are going to distinguish between deterministic and non-
deterministic situations. We refer to [89] for this characterization. With the
term determinism we denote the fact that any action performed by an ac-
tor is guaranteed to have always the same outcome so that, for instance, it
always fails or succeeds. If this is not guaranteed so that an actor must check
the outcome of his actions to verify their effective outcomes we speak of non
determinism. We stress how this distinction has nothing to do with prob-
ability assignments of success or failure and tries to describe the interactions
of the decision processes of autonomous actors that competitively act in the
same environment.
The same is partially true for the term model that we are going to use in
many places. With this term we mean an abstract description of some as-
pects of a portion of the “real world”, whatever this may mean. As such a
model takes in consideration only some aspects in a goal dependent context.
Since the word enters in the title of the thesis we are going to examine it in
some detail in Chapter 1 together with some of the other words of the title.
In this dissertation we are going to use mainly system dynamics mod-
els but also game theory models and models of [collective] decision and
choice. Obviously the basics of such topics are given for granted but for
some aspects that are examined in the Appendices in ad hoc footnotes.
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Preface or the genesis
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to”, said the Cat.
“I don’t much care where-” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go.” said the Cat.
“-so long as I get somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation.
“Oh, you’re sure to do that”, said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough”
L. Carrol
When I decided to engage myself in a PhD course the only thing I had
clear in my mind was the person with whom I wished to work, that is to say
the supervisor of my Master Degree Thesis, Giorgio Gallo.
From any other point of view I was in Alice’s position: I had no idea either of
what PhD course I could choose or about the topic of my [future] dissertation
thesis or the very nature of a PhD course itself. I had a feeling, a desire of
performing some research and, possibly, some teaching, just to go somewhere
but without any clear place to go.
I owe all to Giorgio. First of all he was so kind to avoid saying me that maybe
my idea was crazy, to say the less, then he directed me to the proper PhD
course. He told me that I had to study some economics but that it could
have been a somewhat pleasant burden. During the three years of my PhD
studies (that became four along the way and are going to be six at the end
of the story) I indeed had to study some economics, mainly under the form
of formal models from more or less traditional points of view. I also studied
some Game Theory and found it interesting but puzzling since its concepts
are based on a normative vision of the world that in many cases lacks of a
real explanatory power. Moreover the fact that Game Theory (at least in
its classical form) pretends to deal with rational and neither benevolent nor
malevolent players prevents the analysis of many real situations where the
involved actors are guided by such feelings or by spitefulness, grudge or the
like.
At the same time I had the chance to attend some regular university courses
such as “Mediazione e Conciliazione” (Mediation and Conciliation), “Econo-
mia Ecologica” (Ecological Economics), “Decisioni in Situazioni di Comp-
lessita` e Conflitto” (Decisions in Situations of Complexity and Conflict),
“Modellistica Ambientale” (Environmental Modeling) (these two last courses
had Giorgio as lecturer) and this broadened my vision of economics and let
me know the existence of concepts, processes and points of view that aim at
obtaining more holistic solutions to problems and conflicts.
The course of “Mediazione e Conciliazione” proved very valuable since I could
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appreciate the importance of consensual procedures aiming at the reaching
of win-win agreements in many spheres with particular attention to social
conflicts among groups involving also the environment.
Attending the course of “Economia Ecologica” I could appreciate points of
view far away from the neoclassical approach. That course introduced me
to concepts such as positive and negative externalities and natural capital
going beyond the pure economic cycle of demand and supply with the use of
environmental constraints represented by the laws of thermodynamics that
prevent an unlimited growth of both population and consumption.
Attending the course on “Decisioni in Situazioni di Complessita` e Con-
flitto” I was introduced to new topics but also I could frame my knowl-
edge of other topics within the environmental domain. Among those of
the former type I mention here projects evaluation (costs/benefits analy-
sis, costs/effectiveness analysis, multicriteria analysis); conflicts management
and transformation; voting and choice methods; co-operation, competition
and exploitation. Among those of the latter type I mention here the struc-
turing of problems and system dynamics.
Beyond what I have already said Giorgio’s contributions are almost uncount-
able. First of all he suggested the title of the thesis and many of its topics. He
also suggested me a lot of good readings and had to correct the uncountable
errors and misspellings of the various versions of this thesis (at least three or
four). Then he had to contrast my tendency to “creative” digressions so to
keep me on track, surely the labor of Sisyphus. Last but not least he spent
a lot of time in trying to convince me that my way of writing the thesis was
wrong, that I had to be more precise, cite the sources, avoid to reinvent the
wheel and to devise strange ways to heat the water, some self evident (but
not for me) applications of Occam’s razor.
He also let me act both as a voluntary tutor and as a contract holder (for
five consecutive years) in his university course of “Modellistica Ambientale”
(Environmental Modeling) where I could both practice some teaching, be in
contact with younger and clever students and deepen my knowledge of Sys-
tem Dynamics and apply it to environmental matters.
All this is mirrored in the thesis, both in its structure, in the topics it deals
with and the ways through which this is done.
And now “rise up the hem of the skirt, my Lord, since we are going to hell”3.
3Williams Carlos Williams, freely back translated from his preface to the Italian version
of “Howl and other poems” by Allen Ginsberg.
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